Yoon et al. proposed a new efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards to solve the security problems of W. C. Ku and S. M. Chen's scheme. This paper reviews Yoon et al.'s scheme and then proves that the password change phase of Yoon et al's scheme is still insecure. This paper also proves that the Yoon et al. is still vulnerable to parallel session attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
To gain the access rights on an authentication server (AS), a password based remote user authentication schemes is used. The remote user makes a login request with the help of some secret information which are provided by the AS. On the other side the AS checks the validity of a login request made by a remote user U. In these schemes, the AS and the remote user U share a secret, which is often called as password. With the knowledge of this password, the remote user U uses it to create a valid login request to the AS. AS checks the validity of the login request to provide the access rights to the user U.
Password authentication schemes with smart cards have a long history in the remote user authentication environment. So far different types of password authentication schemes with smarts cards [3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 31] have been proposed.
In 1981, Lamport [17] proposed the first well-known remote password authentication scheme using smart cards. In Lamport's scheme, the AS stores a password table at the server to check the validity of the login request made by the user. However, high hash overhead and the necessity for password resetting decrease the suitability and practical ability of Lamport's scheme. In addition, the Lamport scheme is vulnerable to a small n attack [7] . Since then, many similar schemes [25, 28] Actually, this property is a disadvantage for the security point of view. Keep in mind all the security requirements for a secure remote user authentication scheme,in 2002, ChienJan-Tseng [13] introduced an efficient remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. In 2004, Ku and Chen [33] pointed out some attacks [7, 30, 32] on Chien -Jan and Tseng's scheme. According to Ku and Chen, Chien et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to a reflection attack [7] and an insider attack [32] . Ku and Chen claimed that Chien et al.'s scheme is also not reparable [32] . In addition, they also proposed an improved scheme to prevent these attacks: reflection attack and an insider attack on Chien-Jan-Tseng's scheme. In the same year, Hsu [10] pointed out that the Chien-Jan-Tseng's scheme is still vulnerable to a parallel session attack and Yoon et al. [11] claimed that the password change phase of improved scheme of Chien-Jan-Tseng's scheme is still insecure. This paper proves that security vulnerabilities still exit in Yoon et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to parallel session attack.
Organization
Section II reviews Yoon et al.'s scheme [11] . Section III is about our observations on the security vulnerabilities of Yoon et al.'s scheme. Finally, comes to a conclusion in section IV.
II. YOON ET AL.'S SCHEME
This section briefly describes Yoon et al.'s scheme [11] . This scheme has four phases: the registration phase, login phase, verification phase and the password change phase. All these four phases are described below.
A. Registration Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U initially or re-registers to AS. Let n denotes the number of times U re-registers to AS. The following steps are involved in this phase.
User U selects a random number b and computes PW S = f (b ⊕ PW) and submits her/his identity ID and PW S to the AS through a secure channel.
AS computes two secret numbers
where EID = (ID║n) and creates an entry for the user U in his account database and stores n = 0 for initial registration, otherwise set n= n+1, and n denotes the present registration.
AS provides a smart card to the user U through a secure channel. The smart card contains two secret numbers V, R and a one-way function f.
User U enters her/his random number b into his smart card.
B. Login Phase
For login, the user U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys the identity and the password to gain access services. The smart card will perform the following operations:
Here T U denotes the current date and time of the smart card reader.
Sends a login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) to the AS.
C. Verification Phase
Assume AS receives the message C at time T S , where T S is the current date and time at
AS. Then the AS takes the following actions:
If the identity ID and the time T U is invalid i.e. T U =T S , then AS will rejects this login request.
, then the AS accepts the login request and
Otherwise, the login request C will be rejected.
AS sends the pair T S and C 3 to the user U for mutual authentication. 
D. Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his password PW with a new one, say PW new . This phase has the following steps.
U inserts her/his smart card to the smart card reader and then keys her/his identity and the old password PW and then requests to change the password.
U's smart cards computes
Compare this calculated value V* with the secret value V, which is stored in the smart card of the user U. If they are equal, then U can select a new password PW new , otherwise the smart card rejects the password change request. 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF YOON ET AL.'S SCHEME

A. Security Analysis of the Password Change Phase
This section discusses the security weaknesses of the password change of Yoon et al.'s scheme. The discussion is divided into two subsections, which are described below. Kocher et al. [24] and Messerges et al. [31] , for the security point of view, to store the secret information in smart cards is not a good practice. On the basis of these assumptions [24, 31] , an antagonist is able to breach the secrets V, R and b, which are stored in the smart card of the user and then he will be able to perform a password guessing attack to obtain the password. For the success of this attack, by using the breached secrets R and b the adversary will perform the following operations:
• The antagonist intercepts the login request C = (ID, C 2 , T U ) and guesses a password PW * .
• Computes C 1
• Once the adversary has correctly obtained C 1 , instantly, the password PW * corresponding to C 1 will be the correct password and then successfully, he can change the password of the user U. Consequently, when the smart card was stolen, the antagonist is able to recover the password PW of the user and once the adversary has correctly obtain the password PW, then he will be able to destruct anything of his choice. Since our focus and aim is to show that the password change phase of Yoon et al.'s scheme, which is shown below that an authorized user ( antagonist) can easily replace the old password PW by a new password of her/his choice. For the success, the antagonist applies the following actions.
• Inters the smart card into the smart card reader, enters the identity ID and any password PW and then requests to change the password.
• 
and then replaces R with R * new . Thus, if the malicious user stole the user U's smart card she/he will be able to make a destructive action of her/his choice. Thus, the adversary is able to change the password with a new password of his/his choice. Now the registered/ legal user U also will not be able to make a valid login request with her/his valid smart card because now the her/his old password PW will not work . Suppose the user U is using the same password PW continuously, which is supplied by the AS at the time of registration, then the insider at AS will be able to change the password PW with a new password of her/his choice. If the smart card is in possession of an antagonist insider at AS for short time, then first, the insider inters the smart card into the smart card reader and can directly supply the value V to the smart card reader. Either, he directly supplies V or in place of f (b ⊕ PW), he supplies the value PW S without using the hash button. Next, the antagonist insider enters a new password PW * new and then the smart card computes a new
II. Security weaknesses in the Password
) and then replaces R with R new . Thus, if the malicious insider stole the user U's smart card once, only for a small time and then he can replace the user's password forever in such a way that the user U also will not be able to make a valid login request with her/his valid smart card because now the her/his old password PW will not work properly. As a result, the Yoon et al.'s password change phase is still insecure and that is under the threat of poor reparability.
B. Parallel Session Attack on Yoon et al.'s Scheme
Although, Yoon et al. [11] 
IV. CONCLUSION
As, we have observed that Yoon et al. just consider the security problems in the password change phase of Ku and Chen's scheme and repaired that phase only. They again presented a modified scheme with same security parameters as it was with previous scheme. This paper analyzed that security weaknesses still exist in Yoon et al.'s scheme.
The password change phase is still vulnerable to security attacks by an outsider as well as an antagonist insider at AS. On the other side, Yoon et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to the parallel session attack. Thus, the security pitfalls are still exists in Yoon et al.'s scheme.
